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SUMMARY 
Intelligent Transport System (ITS) technology is seen as a cost-effective way to increase the conspicuity of 
approaching trains and the effectiveness of train warnings at level crossings by providing an in-vehicle 
warning of an approaching train. The technology is often seen as a potential low-cost alternative to 
upgrading passive level crossings with traditional active warning systems (flashing lights and boom barriers). 
ITS platforms provide sensor, localization and dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) technologies 
to support cooperative applications such as collision avoidance for road vehicles.   
In recent years, in-vehicle warning systems based on ITS technology have been trialed at numerous 
locations around Australia, at level crossing sites with active and passive controls. While significant research 
has been conducted on the benefits of the technology in nominal operating modes, little research has 
focused on the effects of the failure modes, the human factors implications of unreliable warnings and the 
technology adoption process from the railway industry’s perspective. Many ITS technology suppliers 
originate from the road industry and often have limited awareness of the safety assurance requirements, 
operational requirements and legal obligations of railway operators. This paper aims to raise awareness of 
these issues and start a discussion on how such technology could be adopted. 
This paper will describe several ITS implementation scenarios and discuss failure modes, human factors 
considerations and the impact these scenarios are likely to have in terms of safety, railway safety assurance 
requirements and the practicability of meeting these requirements. The paper will identify the key obstacles 
impeding the adoption of ITS systems for the different implementation scenarios and a possible path forward 
towards the adoption of ITS technology. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Crashes between road vehicles and trains at 
railway level crossings continue to be a significant 
concern for railways, with more than 23,500 level 
crossings across Australia [1]. Approximately a 
third of rail-related fatalities occurred at the road-
rail interface as a result of collisions between road 
vehicles and trains in the ten-year period from 
2000 to 2009 [2]. This was based on a comparison 
of total rail related fatalities published by the 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau for the ten-
year period from 2001 to 2010 [3] and level 
crossing fatalities from collisions between road 
vehicles and trains published by the Independent 
Transport Safety Regulator, NSW for the ten-year 
period from 2000 to 2009 [2], (occurrence data 
from Australian Transport Safety Bureau was not 
available prior to 2001). Approximately 45% of 
these fatalities occurred at level crossings with 
passive controls, the remainder at level crossings 
with active controls comprised of either flashing 
lights or both flashing lights and boom barriers [2]. 
Lack of awareness of an approaching train was 
identified as the key issue arising from the 1989 
Victorian railway level crossing inquests of seven 
fatal level crossing accidents [4]. Further to these 
findings, in 2000 the coroner issued a viewpoint on 
accidents at railway crossings, citing that there 
had been little progress on “inexpensive and 
effective means of warning motorists of an 
approaching train”. 
In 2008 the parliament of Victoria published the 
findings and recommendations from a 
parliamentary inquiry into improving the safety at 
level crossings [5]. The report investigates new 
and developing technologies for improving safety 
at level crossings, with a focus on Intelligent 
Transport Systems (ITS) and other approaches 
such as low-cost level crossing warning devices. 
The report recommended that the development, 
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trial and adoption of ITS infrastructure be pursued 
(recommendations 31-35 [5]). 
The recent findings from the inquest into 26 level 
crossing deaths including those at the Kerang 
level crossing incident [6] (published in 2013), 
have reiterated the need to “investigate and 
implement new level crossing infrastructure which 
is designed to alert road vehicle drivers to an 
approaching train whom are unresponsive to the 
current suite of level crossing warning signs”. 
While there has been research and trials of ITS-
based in-vehicle warning systems in Victoria and 
Queensland, the majority of the research has 
focused on benefits of the technology rather than 
addressing reliability, safety and overreliance 
issues of the technology.   
This paper brings together the views of a software 
engineer, railway signalling engineer, human 
factors specialist and level crossings manager to 
provide a balanced discussion around the issues 
and obstacles impeding the adoption of ITS-based 
warning systems, and two possible ITS 
development strategies with a medium and longer 
term perspective. 
2. IMPROVING LEVEL CROSSING SAFETY 
WITH ITS 
In-vehicle level crossing warning systems based 
on ITS technology have the potential to enhance 
existing fixed infrastructure warning systems and 
improve road user response. The technology aims 
to achieve this by increasing the conspicuity of an 
approaching train through targeted advice 
provided within the vehicle. 
Level crossings controls have remained virtually 
unchanged since the 1920s. The effectiveness of 
the current suit of active warning devices has been 
widely criticized given the number of incidents in 
which active warnings did not invoke a driver 
response (e.g. level crossing collision at Kerang in 
2007 [7]). Improving road user awareness of 
approaching trains is a key issue for level crossing 
safety.  
ITS-based warning systems represent a 
fundamentally different method of providing level 
crossing information to road users. The technology 
additionally provides the opportunity to deliver an 
enhanced level of information to road users – e.g. 
inform road users of multiple trains and 
communicate effectively the state of a level 
crossing. 
ITS technology can support several 
communication paradigms including vehicle to 
vehicle (V2V), train to vehicle and infrastructure to 
vehicle (I2V) communications. The technology 
could potentially be used to make road users 
aware of an approaching train at level crossings 
either as an overlay to existing active controls 
(flashing lights / boom barriers), as a stand-alone 
system in addition to active controls, or as a stand-
alone system in addition to passive controls (stop 
or give-way signs). 
3. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ADOPTION 
OF AN ITS-BASED LEVEL CROSSING 
WARNING SYSTEM  
3.1. Human Factors Considerations of In-
vehicle Warnings 
One of the most important aspects of any warning 
system is its effectiveness from a human factors 
perspective. This section discusses a number of 
human factors considerations including design of 
the road vehicle human machine interface (HMI), 
design of warnings from a functional perspective, 
and the design of the HMI for the configuration and 
management of on-board train systems used in 
train to vehicle communication paradigms. The 
ability of ITS-based warning systems to either 
enhance or integrate with the vehicle’s internal 
information displays is a fundamental advantage, 
which overcomes many disadvantages of 
traditional, external warning methods. 
3.1.1. Road vehicle human machine interface 
The design of the HMI is a critical aspect of any 
internal level crossing information and warning 
system. Driving requires visual attention and 
provision of further in-vehicle information using 
either traditional visual methods through either 
Head-Down (HDD) or Head-up Displays (HUD) 
may not be the best solution and may actually 
decrease attention to the primary external field of 
view. This is particularly a concern at level 
crossings with passive controls, where the road 
user has the responsibility to scan the external 
field of view for an approaching train. 
Enhanced visual displays to highlight salient 
features of the external view (for example, 
pedestrians, lane markings and signage under 
degraded lighting conditions) have been trialled 
and similar methods could be applied to a level 
crossing ITS display. Auditory alerts are 
rudimentary in current vehicles and can be 
improved by iconic signal design, which provides 
both type and directionality of information. 
However, auditory inputs are subject to 
interference from other sources such as 
entertainment systems and mobile devices.  
Inattentional blindness, inattentional deafness and 
individual visual and hearing impairment are 
factors that need to be considered; there is no 
guarantee that either visual or auditory warnings 
will be perceived and subsequently acted upon [8, 
9]. Tactile / haptic methods have proven to be 
effective in defence applications [10] and their 
adaption into vehicles promise another layer of 
information presentation either supplementing 
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other modalities or acting as primary warning 
systems (although use of an ITS-based level 
crossing warning system as a primary warning 
would currently not be contemplated due to 
considerations discussed later in this section).  
Further research into this aspect is required as 
congruent information provided across all sensory 
modalities not only provides redundancy and 
flexibility but will also enable the optimal method 
for imparting warning information dependant on 
particular circumstances.  
Warnings signals ideally need to be intuitive and 
affective, or induce the appropriate behavioural 
reaction, in order to be effective. Although some 
standards exist with regard to symbology in road 
vehicles, these may vary across manufacturers 
with cursory usability testing. Similarly, auditory 
alerts are typically abstract and require 
deciphering by the driver to deduce meaning. 
Iconic signal selection provides inherent meaning 
and affect. Directionality can also be incorporated 
into well-designed multi-sensory systems.  
Level crossing ITS warning frequency would vary 
from rarely to frequently depending on 
circumstance. It is important that instant 
recognition be a critical factor of system design. 
3.1.2. In-vehicle warning from a functional 
perspective 
One of the key issues around the adoption of in-
vehicle warning systems is its use at level 
crossings with passive controls. There is concern 
that providing warning of an approaching train at 
this type of crossing would result in the system 
becoming a de-facto primary control as a result of 
road users becoming over-reliant on the 
technology. 
A simulation study conducted by the Cooperative 
Research Centre for Rail Innovation [11] found 
that a significant proportion of participants 
modified their driving behaviour when approaching 
level crossings with passive controls, where the in-
vehicle warning technology was present. The 
modification of behaviour was consistent with 
increased approach speeds and a reduction of 
active scanning found at level crossings with 
active controls. Furthermore, a number of the 
participants no longer complied with the stop signs 
at level crossings with passive controls when the 
in-vehicle warning was present. The study was 
performed in an immersive simulation environment 
using a vehicle on a motion platform.  
Even though the observations were responses of 
participants to a simulation, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that the observed behaviour would 
transfer to the real-world road environment. Over-
reliance on the technology must therefore be 
considered in terms of the functions the 
technology provides and the reliability of these 
functions, especially in situations where the 
existing level crossing controls do not provide a 
train approach warning. 
Ideally, any system would be designed to 
encourage a user to visually scan the level 
crossing – in effect a multi stage process which 
would firstly alert to the presence of a level 
crossing, either provide information as to a train 
approach and its direction or a fault alert – the 
desired result would be to orient visual attention to 
the potential threat, whether it be an actual train as 
detected by the system, or the physical level 
crossing itself and potential for approaching trains 
if and when the system is not operating.  
In terms of the warning functions and information 
sets provided to road users, integration of current 
systems with ITS would need careful consideration 
so that inconsistencies or competition between the 
systems does not occur. For example, 
inconsistencies in minimum warning times 
between active level crossing warnings and the in-
vehicle warnings could lead to reduced 
compliance with fixed infrastructure warnings and 
over-reliance on the in-vehicle technology, which 
is unlikely to be as reliable as the existing 
infrastructure.  
However, infrastructure level crossing systems are 
often constrained by a number of factors that may 
contribute to a less than optimal warning. For 
example, level crossings controlled by track 
circuits will provide longer warnings for slow trains 
and in the case of a second train engaging the 
level crossing, the warning will remain engaged for 
an extended period. Further research is required 
to determine how best to provide warning 
consistency and optimal warning times, potentially 
through a hierarchy of warnings. Ideally, the 
infrastructure and in-vehicle system would be 
configured to provide a seamless integration or 
transition from legacy to ITS systems. Establishing 
optimal warning times for in-vehicle systems would 
require consideration of human memory, attention 
capabilities and limitations. Warnings should be 
presented with adequate time to take action 
according to the circumstance, but not be 
excessive. Further research is required to quantify 
this. 
Lastly, the implications of a multi-application 
environment would need to be considered. The 
level crossing warning application would 
potentially be one of several applications on a 
standardized computing and communications 
platform. The road industry is currently developing 
and standardizing such platforms based on 
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC). 
The acceptance that a level crossing warning 
application would be part of an integrated suite of 
applications (such as collision warning, emergency 
electronic brake light, dangerous conditions 
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warning, etc.) would enable a holistic design of the 
overall system. Multimodal information display, 
standard and congruent warning methods across 
platforms, and a hierarchy of alerts would need to 
be a central theme requiring some form of 
mandated standard. Any alerts would ideally be 
standard across vehicles, instantly recognised and 
responsive to particular circumstances so that they 
have similar effectiveness over a range of 
conditions. A similar requirement as per the 
national rail safety legislation that human factors 
be incorporated into any initiatives and be 
formulated by professional and experienced HF 
practitioners may be necessary [12]. 
3.1.3. Rail human machine interface for train-
borne systems 
An ITS-based level crossing warning system that 
utilizes train to vehicle communications would 
need to carefully consider the design of the HMI 
used to configure and monitor the state of train-
borne on-board units (OBUs).  
In some “train to vehicle” implementations, the 
length of the rail vehicle may need to be 
configured in the OBU so that the warning function 
can determine when the rail vehicle has passed 
the level crossing clearance point. While length for 
passenger trains could potentially be set for the 
largest consist or location determination units fitted 
to the front and rear of each rail car set, freight 
trains require special consideration as they would 
have other factors e.g. lack of side-lights and 
variety of consist, which differ from typical 
passenger trains. 
Changing consists and last minute operational 
changes could result in insufficient or excessive 
warnings if the on-board configuration does not 
reflect the train configuration. The design of the 
HMI would also need to consider how human 
interaction with the system for configuration and 
monitoring would affect the workload of the train 
crew.  
3.2. Technical Considerations 
The previous subsections have discussed the 
design of HMI and warning functions from a 
human factors perspective. It is particularly 
apparent from these discussions that integrity and 
reliability of the system are critical aspects of 
system design, especially where road users are 
prone to over-reliance on the technology. This 
section will discuss technical considerations of 
various approaches to implementing ITS-based 
warning systems and their potential effect on 
safety.  
Where ITS-based warning systems are based on a 
train to vehicle communications paradigm, the 
following issues would need to be considered: 
• To ensure that a warning is provided for all 
approaching trains, 100% of rail vehicles 
including track maintenance and hi-rail 
vehicles would need to be fitted with an on-
board unit (OBU). 
• In the case a train-borne OBU fails, the effect 
of the failure is that no warning would be 
provided to road users for all level crossings 
with passive controls traversed by the train 
while the OBU remained in a failed state. If in-
vehicle warning systems or road vehicles are 
unable to detect the failure of a train-borne 
OBU, then this failure results in a dangerous 
state for all passive level crossings traversed 
by the train. Despite the presence of passive 
controls and the obligation of road users to 
look for trains, over-reliance on the in-vehicle 
technology could potentially lead to a collision. 
• To mitigate the risk resulting from an OBU 
failure, trains may have to stop or approach 
level crossings at a significantly reduced 
speed. This could severely impact operations 
and potentially result in large losses to the 
railway operator in terms of delays, etc. 
Reliability requirements of the OBU (and 
associated cost) may need to be balanced 
against the potential financial impact of 
stopping or slowing down trains. 
• Railways generally have procedures for 
operating in degraded modes due to failure 
conditions. An added complexity of this type of 
failure is that it manifests itself to road users. 
Persistence of the failure is also an issue, as a 
train may not be able to stop as a result of the 
failure. While the train continues operation with 
a failed OBU, road users are exposed to an 
increased level of risk at level crossings. 
Perhaps an extra level of conspicuity of trains 
in this instance, or a fail-safe function that 
reacts when a failure mode is detected could 
be a solution. 
• Configuration management for train-borne 
OBUs needs to be considered, especially 
where track databases or maps (i.e. with level 
crossing locations) are used by train-borne 
location determination systems. Addition, 
removal or modification of level crossings 
would need to be reflected in the respective 
train-borne systems. 
• Localization technologies such as GPS are a 
key component to the “train to vehicle” 
paradigm. As the location function is used to 
determine when the train is approaching a 
level crossing in order to provide a warning, it 
is inherently safety-related. As such, errors or 
failures in the location determination function 
can result in excessive, insufficient or no 
warning to road users. There is precedence for 
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high-integrity location determination for 
automatic train protection and control 
functions. For example, ERTMS level 2 and 
some ATP systems calculate position on the 
track using wheel odometry calibrated by 
balises and have Doppler radar to compensate 
for wheel slip and slide. ATMS on the other 
hand, calculates position using an on-board 
track database containing absolute reference 
points and a Kalman filter combining GPS with 
wheel odometry and inertial sensors [13]. 
Train-borne OBUs could potentially interface 
with existing vital location determination 
systems, especially for railways that are 
planning ATP or ERTMS deployments. 
The following technical issues related to the in-
vehicle on-board units in road vehicles would need 
to be considered: 
• The road user should be made aware of the 
operating state of the in-vehicle warning 
system. Failure of the system to provide the 
warning function (whether it be due to failures 
of hardware, software or communications) 
should be evident to the road user. If the 
system is unreliable, road users will tend to 
disregard it or lose confidence in its accuracy. 
It is highly important to ensure that the system 
is tried and tested before release to the 
general public. 
• One of the key features of in-vehicle warning 
systems is the ability to provide context-aware 
warnings (e.g. a different warning when a road 
vehicle is travelling parallel to a railway 
compared with a direct approach to a level 
crossing). Future systems may include some 
form of input as to the intent of the operator. 
For example, if the planned route does not 
cross the railway, there would be no need to 
provide any warning information at all, thus 
eliminating spurious and unnecessary 
warnings (except where the vehicle changes 
course with respect to the planned route). The 
ability to toggle the system according to intent, 
or another method of communicating this to 
the system is desirable. Integration with GPS 
and route planning software could be a means 
to achieving this aim.  
• If the in-vehicle warning system has been 
designed to provide context-aware warnings, 
dependent functions such as mapping, routing 
and location determination effectively become 
safety-related functions. Errors in the mapping, 
routing or location determination functions 
could cause incorrect warnings or no warning 
at all to be provided to road users. Ensuring 
accuracy and maintenance of map data as 
well as integrity of the location determination 
function are important issues that would need 
to be considered.  
3.3. Adoption Considerations 
In addition to human factors and technical issues, 
adoption of the technology presents some unique 
challenges.  
From the rail perspective, a key issue with the 
progressive implementation of ITS infrastructure is 
that not all crossings would provide an in-vehicle 
warning to road users. Where in-vehicle warnings 
are provided to road users in addition to existing 
active controls, it may be possible to make an 
argument for a progressive implementation. A 
public education program would appear a 
necessity with the introduction of the road vehicle 
component into operation, where mechanisms to 
advise road users of updated or modified 
functionality would need to be considered. 
For ITS systems based on a train to vehicle 
paradigm, the implementation strategy would be 
complicated by the possible use of the technology 
to provide a train approach warning to road users 
at level crossings with passive controls. The 
railway operator would need to ensure 100% of 
the fleet (including hi-rail and maintenance 
vehicles) is equipped with the train-borne OBUs 
before the warning system is made operational. It 
is unlikely a transitional approach involving a 
staged implementation on a corridor basis would 
be practicable, even if workable from a rail 
perspective. 
Adoption of ITS-based level crossing warning 
systems will impose ongoing resourcing and cost 
considerations, particularly on the rail and road 
authorities. For I2V scenarios, the installation, 
monitoring and maintenance of road-side ITS 
infrastructure would be required. Depending 
agreements between road and rail authorities, 
road-side ITS infrastructure could be maintained 
by road authorities. While the rail authorities may 
have the resources and skill sets to install, 
maintain and monitor ITS equipment (train-borne 
or track-side), many councils may not. For I2V 
scenarios involving the installation of road-side ITS 
infrastructure that interfaces with railway systems, 
a coordinated approach is required. 
From the road perspective, adoption of on-board 
units in road vehicles is one of the key issues. In 
order to ascertain the expected magnitude of risk 
reduction provided by ITS-based in-vehicle 
warnings, the expected uptake of the technology 
needs to be understood. While there are many 
projections of future cars providing multi-
application platforms and the availability of after-
market units, without a government mandate or 
incentives, uptake by road users could be one of 
the biggest obstacles this technology faces. 
Government programs such as the Intelligent 
Access Program (IAP) could provide an ideal 
platform to target higher-risk vehicles. IAP is a 
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tracking system for compliance, where operators 
of high-risk vehicles (e.g. heavy vehicles) agree to 
installation of the remote monitoring in return for 
less restrictive road access. High mass permit 
vehicles may be able to have the installation of the 
units mandated as part of the licencing regime. 
Whilst after-market units may be the easiest 
method of disseminating new technology into the 
older vehicle fleet, the urge to make DSRC 
technology widely available must be tempered by 
how these units will be integrated into the vehicle. 
There is evidence for example, that poor 
placement of GPS navigation units can impact on 
visibility, contribute to driver distraction and 
significantly degrade overall safety. A framework 
for determining how new technology is integrated 
into vehicles without compromising existing 
systems is highly desirable. The easiest and 
cheapest method may not always be the best nor 
safest. 
3.4. Obstacles to Adoption of ITS  
Liability for failure of an in-vehicle warning system 
resulting in a collision is one of the major concerns 
of railway operators in adopting ITS-based 
technology, particularly where train-borne on-
board units (OBUs) are installed. Consider a level 
crossing with passive controls. There is a degree 
of shared risk ownership. The railway is 
responsible for ensuring that the level crossing has 
sufficient sighting, for maintenance activities 
stipulated in the safety interface agreement (SIA), 
etc.; the road authority is responsible for 
approaches to the level crossing and maintenance 
activities stipulated in the SIA; and the road user is 
responsible for obeying road rules and checking 
for trains before traversing the crossing. 
Where technology is implemented to reduce risk at 
a level crossing, the railway is likely to be 
responsible for the additional liability related to the 
dangerous failure of that technology (e.g. when 
flashing lights fail to operate when train is 
approaching). This additional liability however, is 
offset by the liability of having high-risk level 
crossings with passive controls (e.g. with 
inadequate sighting). In the case of ITS-based in-
vehicle warning systems, the clear delineation of 
responsibility is blurred by the distributed nature of 
the technology – i.e. the technology has train-
borne, road-side and in-vehicle components. 
These issues of legal liability also occur in the road 
environment for other I2V applications and are 
being considered as part of the general 
development of the technology; however, the 
particular requirements of the rail environment 
must also be satisfied. 
From the railway’s perspective, a number of 
questions arise: Where does responsibility for 
correct functioning of the system lie? Is it restricted 
to ensuring that train-borne OBUs are operational 
or does it extend to provision of a warning to the 
road user? Who is responsible for ensuring the 
integrity of the in-vehicle OBUs (i.e. regular 
maintenance and testing)? From the railway’s 
perspective, how could a safety case be 
developed around a component in a person’s 
vehicle? 
In the event of a failure resulting in no warning 
being provided to the road user of an approaching 
train, how would the source of failure be 
determined? Would the railway be liable if an in-
vehicle unit did not receive the signal from an 
approaching train? There are instances where the 
train-borne OBU would be operating correctly and 
transmit a signal, but due issues in the 
propagation environment (e.g. interference, etc.), 
the signal may not be received by the in-vehicle 
OBU. 
Further research is needed to identify in-vehicle 
technologies and communication paradigms that 
can be adopted within the current legal and 
regulatory landscape, and whether a case for 
legislative change indemnifying rail operators of 
liability in certain circumstances could (or should) 
be made.  
In addition to responsibility for technical failures, 
reluctance to adopt these new technologies is also 
influenced by the lack of substantial evidence 
supporting the effectiveness of these systems. In 
order to determine whether implementation of 
such systems is reasonably practicable, it is 
necessary to quantify the magnitude of risk 
reduction afforded by the adoption of in-vehicle 
warning systems. Larger trials and further 
research to determine uptake of in-vehicle 
systems are required to facilitate this. A holistic 
human factors analysis of all effects from ITS 
systems can assist in assessing and quantifying 
these risks.  
4. PROPOSED ITS DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES 
This section describes a possible path forward for 
the development and adoption of ITS-based in-
vehicle level crossing warning systems. Based on 
the human factors, technical and commercial 
considerations discussed in the previous section, 
two strategies are described: 
• A short/medium term development strategy 
based on an infrastructure to vehicle (I2V) 
communications paradigm with the view to 
addressing recommendations from the Kerang 
coronial inquest [6] relating to the use of in-
vehicle warning technologies; and 
• A longer-term research and development 
strategy investigating vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
communication paradigms (where V2V 
includes train-to-vehicle communications) in 
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addition to the I2V paradigm developed in the 
earlier strategy. 
The philosophy behind the first strategy is to find a 
pragmatic way forward for in-vehicle level crossing 
warning systems within the current regulatory and 
legislative frameworks, allowing for a large test-
bed deployment to gather additional data under in-
service operating conditions.  
The cornerstone of this strategy is a clear 
delineation of responsibility between road and rail 
authorities, where interface agreements, as 
required under the national rail safety legislation 
(subdivision 2 – interface agreements) [12], would 
provide the framework for demarcation of roles 
and responsibilities in relation to the 
implementation and maintenance of in-vehicle 
warning system infrastructure. 
The current suite of research on low-cost level 
crossing warning devices being conducted by the 
CRC for Rail Innovation would complement this 
strategy. Low-cost level crossing warning devices 
(LCLCWDs), as with conventional level crossing 
warning devices, provide a vital train approach 
indication that can be interfaced to in-vehicle 
warning system infrastructure. 
The low-cost level crossing research programme is 
not only conducting a national trial of LCLCWDs, 
but is developing a generic application safety case 
supporting a risk-commensurate approach to the 
adoption of such technologies [14-16]. Specifically, 
the approach can be summarized as supporting 
LCLCWDs with a level of safety integrity for 
“warning level crossing users of an approaching 
train” that is at least commensurate to the 
magnitude of risk reduction required to meet 
tolerable hazard rates for system hazards 
including “collision between road and rail vehicle”. 
As a significant proportion of level crossing 
warning device costs are influenced by safety 
integrity requirements, this approach can support 
the adoption of substantially lower-cost warning 
systems, allowing more level crossings to be 
upgraded each year for a given budget. Interfacing 
LCLCWDs with ITS-based in-vehicle warning 
technology is a logical step in providing a cost-
effective improvement to level crossing safety. A 
holistic approach to level crossing safety is 
essential, where both the proposed strategy and 
low-cost level crossing research can support a 
larger strategy for a consistent and comprehensive 
approach to level crossing improvement. The key 
components of the first strategy include: 
Further research to provide evidence for the 
specification of industry-wide standards: 
• HMI design for effective presentation of 
information to the road user including: effective 
communication of system state (i.e. for failure 
states), optimal warning times, sensory 
method to best impart warning information, 
etc.; 
• Investigation of adoption strategies for the 
technology. This should include engagement 
with vehicle manufacturers and investigation of 
government mandated installation for high risk 
vehicles, etc.; 
• Development of a safety argument addressing 
requirements for reliability and integrity; and 
• Development of an economic argument based 
on the various adoption strategies. 
Development of draft performance-based 
standards for an in-vehicle level crossing warning 
application: 
• Definition of warning functions, operating 
principles, where intelligent warnings are 
based on proven human factors principles and 
applied in context; 
• Specification of reliability and integrity targets; 
and 
• Human factors rules and methods to support 
an integrated application design for a multi-
application environment. 
Large test-bed deployment: 
• Facilitation of a test-bed deployment with the 
objective of collecting a substantial amount of 
data to support an argument for wide-spread 
adoption;  
• Review of the draft standards based on data 
and evidence from the test-bed; and 
• Lobbying state / federal governments for 
appropriate support and legislative change to 
facilitate a nationally consistent approach to 
adoption. The support aspect includes 
development of an appropriate framework for 
accreditation of suppliers and application 
developers. 
While the first strategy is conservative in its 
approach, it is not intended to preclude other 
approaches such as the use of train to vehicle 
communications. Due to the complexities of such 
paradigms, as discussed earlier in this paper, we 
believe that further research would be needed to 
determine the impact on human performance and 
to establish how appropriate levels of reliability 
could be achieved. The longer-term strategy 
addresses the need for additional research in 
order to support an evidence-based approach to 
the implementation and adoption of such 
paradigms. Key research components of the 
strategy include: 
• Investigation of reliability and integrity aspects 
of innovative communications and technology 
paradigms including V2V and train to vehicle 
communications;  
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• Investigation of technology evolution and how 
innovative communication paradigms can 
complement the previous strategy – e.g. train 
to vehicle communications used to provide a 
train approach warning at level crossings with 
passive controls, and as an additional safety 
control in case of I2V failure; 
• Research into the potential use of existing vital 
train on-board location determination systems 
(used to support train protection and control 
functions in ERTMS, ATMS, and other in-cab 
ATP systems) for the provision of train 
approach warnings at level crossings; 
• Research into optimal human factors design 
for innovative technology paradigms; and 
• Research into overreliance issues associated 
with the provision of a train approach warning 
at level crossings with passive controls, 
providing evidence to inform design and 
potentially appropriate reliability and integrity 
targets. 
5. IN-VEHICLE LEVEL CROSSING WARNING 
SYSTEM BASED ON AN I2V 
COMMUNICATIONS PARADIGM 
This section describes the vision for an in-vehicle 
level crossing warning system based on an 
infrastructure to vehicle (I2V) communications 
paradigm. Conceptually, the railway provides a 
vital train approach indication (and potentially 
other information) to a road-side controller, which 
interfaces to a road-side unit that facilitates 
communications between the infrastructure and 
the vehicle. 
5.1. Rail-side to Road-side Communication 
Standards 
The proposed approach involves the use of 
established standards for traffic light 
synchronization between rail and road subsystems 
to provide the interface between the vital level 
crossing equipment and the road-side unit for the 
in-vehicle warning system.  
Current practice for traffic light synchronization in 
some jurisdictions in Australia involves the use of 
a linking cable between the vital level crossing 
equipment and a traffic controller. The connection 
from the level crossing equipment is installed in 
accordance with an approved railway design 
typically involving suitable levels of isolation and 
surge protection, minimising risk to railway 
equipment from failures, surges, inductions or 
lighting strikes. In a draft Victorian standard on 
level crossing infrastructure [17], responsibilities in 
relation to the interconnection of rail and road 
systems for traffic light coordination are defined, 
noting that connections in the traffic controller are 
to be made by the road authority. Precedence for 
such interconnections and a clear division of 
responsibility are strong arguments in support for 
this approach.  
The above interconnection method only provides a 
simple logic input to the traffic controller indicating 
protection state of the level crossing. As an interim 
solution, it provides a relatively low-cost method to 
interface ITS I2V communications infrastructure to 
vital railway systems. There is however, an 
opportunity to provide greater levels of information 
from the railway infrastructure to facilitate more 
“intelligent” warnings. Using standards such as 
IEEE 1570: Standard for the Interface Between the 
Rail Subsystem and the Highway Subsystem at a 
Highway Rail Intersection [18] for interconnection 
between rail and road systems, additional 
information including level crossing operating 
state, wayside equipment state, train movements 
(direction, speed, estimated arrival and departure 
times) and other user-defined information can be 
provided to the traffic controller.  
This standard defines logical and physical 
interfaces and performance attributes for 
interconnection between rail and road systems at 
level crossings. A high level illustration of the 
interface between the two systems is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. IEEE 1570 based approach 
 
The wayside equipment gateway would provide a 
vital train approach indication (and other relevant 
information) to the road subsystem. Railway 
operators would be responsible for the installation, 
commissioning and maintenance of this 
component as part of the level crossing.  
In order for railway operators to meet duty of care 
obligations under the national rail safety legislation 
(subdivision 2 – duties, section 52) [12], they 
would need to ensure that this component and its 
interfaces to existing level crossing equipment are 
safe so far as is reasonably practicable. As part of 
the approval of such equipment (i.e. the wayside 
equipment gateway), evidence of functional and 
technical safety would typically be provided in a 
technical safety report that includes evidence of 
safety analyses, design principles and technical 
principles that assure safety of the design [19-23].  
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Designers, manufacturers and suppliers of such 
equipment also have obligations under the 
national rail safety legislation (section 53 – duties 
of designers, manufacturers, suppliers, etc.) [12] to 
ensure that the equipment is safe if used for the 
purpose for which it is designed so far as is 
reasonably practicable. 
As the railway would only be responsible for the 
vital train indication provided by the wayside 
gateway, its responsibility would theoretically be 
delineated from the road subsystem (as in current 
traffic light synchronization scenarios), which 
operates within a very different legal and 
regulatory landscape. In contrast to the legislative 
requirements for safety in the rail environment, 
road safety legislation typically relates to 
individuals where road users are prosecuted for 
dangerous driving, use of a vehicle that is not road 
worthy, etc.  
The advanced transportation controller gateway 
(part of the road subsystem) would communicate 
with the wayside gateway via the IEEE 1570 
interface. The transportation controller could also 
be used to communicate state information (e.g. 
level crossing equipment failure) to the road 
operations system, facilitating timely notification of 
traffic police. Temporary closure of a level crossing 
could also be propagated via real-time traffic 
congestion update systems (traffic services used 
by GPS navigators), re-routing road users to avoid 
a temporarily closed level crossing. 
Road authorities would be responsible for 
installing, commissioning and maintaining this 
component as part of the road subsystem. While 
outside of the scope of this paper, issues such as 
appropriate levels of remote monitoring and 
alarming for road authorities would need to be 
considered. It is assumed that road-side 
components including the dedicated short range 
communications (DSRC) road-side unit would be 
developed to appropriate road safety standards.  
Responsibility in case of failures of the interface 
between road and rail infrastructure would be 
defined in safety interface agreements, minimising 
the potential for cross-jurisdictional disputes. 
Having a good technical interface specification is 
also essential and will lead to a clear allocation of 
organizational responsibility.  
Having centralised monitoring and maintenance 
functions for ITS infrastructure is likely to reduce 
the impact of local council resources. Issues of 
additional organisational complexity and cost need 
to be taken into consideration as part of the 
systemic costs for implementation of an in-vehicle 
warning system. 
5.1.1. I2V communication standards 
A standards-based approach for infrastructure to 
vehicle (I2V) communications forms part of the 
proposed approach. There is currently an 
international effort to standardize a vehicular 
communication platform (DSRC) to support a 
range of applications from safety to value added 
services. Safety applications include the provision 
of warnings for unsafe conditions and imminent 
collisions; value added services include electronic 
payment for tolling and the provision of real time 
accident and congestion information. 
By supporting a standardized communication 
platform, an open, competitive multi-vendor market 
can be facilitated. It is expected that vehicle 
manufacturers will provide a GPS and DSRC-
enabled multi-application environment in future 
vehicles. The key standards for DSRC are the 
IEEE 1609 suite of standards, the DSRC message 
set standard SAE J2735, and minimum 
performance requirements standard SAE J2945.1 
to support DSRC applications. Note that some of 
these standards are still under development. 
Spectrum allocation is also an ongoing issue in 
Australia, where the Australian Communications 
and Media Authority (ACMA) is working on 
proposals for introduction of ITS at 5.9GHz [24], 
however there are issues relating to existing users 
of the frequency and adjacent frequencies that 
need to be addressed. 
5.1.2. I2V communication reliability 
One of the challenges in providing a safe in-
vehicle warning system is ensuring that failure of 
communications does not result in unsafe states 
(e.g. the road user is not warned when a train is 
approaching). This is complicated by the fact that 
the WAVE Short Message Protocol (WSMP) 
broadcasts short packets in an un-acknowledged 
delivery mode. 
In the case of a communication failure affecting 
the in-vehicle warning as an overlay to an existing 
vital train warning system, the crossing would be 
protected by the existing level crossing 
infrastructure minimising the consequences of an 
in-vehicle warning failure. The proposed I2V 
strategy does not include train to vehicle 
communications, where the risk of failure at a level 
crossing with passive controls would be 
substantially higher for the reasons discussed 
earlier in this paper. Further research and 
investigation into the use of train to vehicle 
communications for in-vehicle warnings forms part 
of the longer-term strategy. 
While DSRC provides various protections against 
threats to message integrity, reliability of safety-
related communications to a large extent needs to 
be managed at the application layer. The on-board 
unit would not know when to expect broadcast 
messages from road-side units, and therefore 
would not know whether a given road-side unit has 
failed. Assuming a vital train approach indication is 
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provided to the advanced transportation controller 
gateway, the challenge is to ensure reliable 
communications between the DSRC road-side unit 
and the DSRC on-board unit, given the 
asynchronous messaging paradigm.  
To determine appropriate targets for integrity and 
reliability of communications, an analysis of threats 
to communications and the hazards they lead to 
should be conducted. As I2V communications 
operate on open channel, malicious threats 
against these communications (e.g. spoofing, 
modification, replay and jamming / denial of 
service) also need to be considered. Of particular 
importance is the ability to authenticate the source 
of the messages (cryptographic authentication) 
and ensure they have not been modified 
(cryptographic integrity). The standard IEEE 
1609.2 [12] describes the DSRC security services 
and defines methods to secure DSRC 
management and application messages. 
5.1.3. Level crossing warning application 
In addition to the reliable messaging provisions 
discussed in the previous subsection, the key 
functions of the level crossing warning application 
need to be defined, including those that are safety-
related. While the DSRC standards provide the 
communications and messaging layers, no level 
crossing warning application has been defined. As 
part of the I2V level crossing warning strategy 
described in this section, it is proposed that a 
committee of rail and road stakeholders develop a 
functional specification for a level crossing warning 
application, which would be based on a thorough 
analysis of the human factors issues involved. The 
specification would also include data (e.g. speed, 
location, heading of vehicle / train) and 
performance (e.g. update rate, accuracy, safety, 
etc.) requirements to support the application. 
One possible approach to determining appropriate 
warning functions involves mapping them to those 
provided by existing infrastructure, such that 
human factors issues discussed earlier in the 
paper including competing and inconsistent 
warnings are effectively controlled.  
Robust and congruent warning methods are key to 
user acceptance and confidence in ITS. 
Integration of human capabilities and limitations in 
the system design and technical specifications will 
ensure that the information provided by DSRC is 
intuitive, timely, relevant, consistent and most 
importantly, able to be perceived and acted upon.   
A possible function mapping for level crossings 
with active controls is detailed in the following 
table. 
 
Function Existing LX  In-vehicle application 
Train 
approach 
warning  
(AS 1742.7 
compliant) 
Activation of 
flashing lights; 
Lowering of 
boom barriers 
Provide “Train 
approach” warning to 
road user; 
Inform road user of 
multiple trains 
Failure 
mode 
Currently 
equivalent to 
train approach 
warning 
Failure state warning; 
Possibility to advise road 
user when level crossing 
restored to normal 
operation 
A pre-warning approach function was considered 
(similar to the steady amber phase in the UK); 
however, the potential for the warning to 
encourage road users to engage in risk taking 
behaviour (i.e. beat the train) needs to be further 
analysed to determine whether this function would 
be beneficial in the Australian context, and 
whether the pre-warning could be processed by 
the in-vehicle system, taking into consideration the 
vehicle’s speed and location to provide a context-
appropriate pre-warning. 
In addition to providing consistent functional 
mappings, there is an opportunity to provide an 
enhanced and targeted level of information to road 
users with in-vehicle warning systems. In 
particular, the warning application can mitigate 
some of the deficiencies of the current level 
crossing design. An example of this is where a 
level crossing is in a failure state (i.e. continuous 
ringing). The level crossing application can provide 
relevant information to road users as to the state 
of the level crossing and what actions to take in 
this situation (e.g. not to traverse, suggestion of an 
alternative route). While further research is needed 
to determine how best to communicate state 
information, such functionality could potentially 
reduce risks associated with mode confusion.  
A possible function mapping for level crossings 
with passive controls is detailed in the following 
table. 
Function Existing LX In-vehicle 
Application 
Warning of 
presence of 
LX 
Passive signs, 
road markings 
compliant with 
1742.7 [25] 
“Prepare to stop and 
look both ways for 
trains” 
The application design should address the 
following key issues: 
• The application needs to provide a clear 
indication to the road user of the system’s 
failure modes. A formal analysis such as 
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) should be used to determine failure 
modes, how they are detected and how they 
will be manifested in the HMI. 
• Design of the HMI, being a critical aspect of 
the level crossing warning system, needs to 
consider the most effective methods to warn 
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and advise the road user. Refer to the 
discussion on HMI in Section 3.1.1.  
• The application needs to consider how to 
manage an internal database of level 
crossings given that warnings will need to be 
provided for 100% of level crossings, whether 
they are with active or passive controls. As 
data contained within this database is used by 
safety-related functions of the application, 
special consideration needs to be given to 
assuring integrity and accuracy of the 
information contained within. 
• Safety needs to be considered in the 
application lifecycle from the specification of 
requirements to software design, development 
and validation activities. This includes an 
analysis of hazards and risk, specification of 
safety requirements and in particular, use of 
appropriate tools and methods for managing 
systematic failure. The Motor Industry 
Software Reliability Association (MISRA) has 
developed a suite of guidelines for integrity 
and safety analysis for vehicle-based software. 
Further investigation is required to determine 
how safety integrity requirements can be met 
within a multi-application environment. 
• An often-overlooked aspect in determining 
overall safety is the holistic environment into 
which new technology is introduced. The 
unfettered introduction of after-market units 
that do not integrate into current platform 
systems, especially with regard to multi-
applications, may actually decrease overall 
road/rail safety and therefore not be the best 
strategy. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has discussed the benefits and 
challenges for the adoption of ITS-based in-vehicle 
level crossing warning systems. Such systems 
have the potential to provide a significant 
improvement to safety; however, without 
considering the technical, human factors and legal 
implications of the various approaches to design, 
implementation and adoption, the technology has 
a limited chance of gaining widespread 
acceptance. 
Two ITS development strategies were proposed: 
the first, a short/medium term strategy with the 
view of finding a pragmatic way forward within 
current legal and regulatory frameworks, and 
addressing recommendations from the Kerang 
inquiry; and the second, a longer-term strategy 
investigating the more complex communication 
paradigms and deployment contexts with a focus 
on human factors and technical research. 
In-vehicle warning systems for level crossings are 
likely to provide the framework for future systems, 
which highlights the importance of ‘getting it right’. 
Both technical and human factors issues must be 
addressed if it is to provide the significant potential 
advantages and performance envisaged. It is 
undesirable to have these facets developed in 
isolation and a smarter approach is to integrate 
human factors into the technical solution. 
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